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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
During John Huey Daniels' jury trial for felony aggravated battery, Mr. Daniels crossexamined a detective about how Mr. Daniels had characterized the alleged victim. The detective
answered that Mr. Daniels had characterized the alleged victim as a gang member, but also
volunteered that Mr. Daniels identified himself as a former prison gang member. That voluntary
statement came after voir dire had revealed that two members of the jury were current or former
employees of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC). Mr. Daniels filed a motion for a
mistrial based on the prejudice from the detective's volunteered statement, but the district court
denied the motion for lack of prejudice and for invited error.
In this appeal, Mr. Daniels asserts the district court committed reversible error when it
denied his motion for a mistrial. The detective's voluntary statement was not invited error,
because the statement was nonresponsive. When viewed in the context of the full record, the
detective's voluntary statement constituted reversible error.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Multiple Garden City and Boise police officers responded to a reported shooting in the
area of 44th Street and Chinden Boulevard in Garden City. (See Tr., p.156, L.3 - p.157, L.2,
p.201, L.18-p.202, L.21, p.238, L.15 -p.239, L.8.) One ofthe officers arrived at a trailer home
in that area, found Chris Anderson with two wounds on his upper abdomen, and accompanied
Mr. Anderson to the hospital. (See Tr., p.157, L.21 - p.159, L.19.) Mr. Anderson had an entry
wound and a bum wound on his abdomen, consistent with being shot once by a gun. (See
Tr., p.193, L.4 - p.194, L.15, p.218, Ls-18-25.) Doctors retrieved a bullet from his abdomen.
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(See Tr., p.195, Ls.8-19, p.219, Ls.1-16.) Mr. Anderson had a hole in his stomach, and the bullet

was close to going into his heart. (See Tr., p.196, L.4-p.197, L.3.)
Another officer en route received information that a suspect was possibly driving a
pickup truck away from the area of the incident. (See Tr., p.202, L.22 - p.203, L. l .) That officer
saw a truck matching the description on Chinden Boulevard, and eventually stopped it. (See
Tr., p.203, L.2 - p.204, L.25.) Mr. Daniels was the driver of the truck, and Naomi Hernandez
was the only passenger. (See Tr., p.210, L.24 - p.211, L.10, p.369, Ls.7-11.) During the stop,
Mr. Daniels told officers there was a gun in the passenger door panel of the truck.

(See

Tr., p.243, Ls.4-12. See generally State's Ex. 25 (body camera footage of the stop).) Officers
then found the gun in the passenger door panel. (See Tr., p.243, Ls.13-17.)
A detective for the Garden City Po lice Department testified that the bullet recovered from
Mr. Anderson was very similar to the bullets found in the gun's magazine. (See Tr., p.241, L.13
- p.242, L.4.) The gun was a 9mm, but the bullets were .380, a wrong caliber for that type of
gun. (See Tr., p.242, Ls.5-11.) However, the detective testified that .380 rounds could be fired
once from a 9mm gun, but the gun would not eject the case. (See Tr., p.242, Ls.12-21.)
Detective O'Gorman testified that he conducted a gunshot residue test on Mr. Daniels at
the police station, and then he interviewed Ms. Hernandez. (See Tr., p.268, L.2 - p.269, L.20.)
He subsequently advised Mr. Daniels of his Miranda rights, and Mr. Daniels agreed to speak
with him.

(See Tr., p.269, Ls.20-25. See generally State's Ex. 23 (video recording of the

interview with Mr. Daniels).) At first, Mr. Daniels was adamant that he had not been involved in
a shooting, but after Detective O'Gorman told him in a "ruse" that the gunshot residue test had
already shown gunshot residue was on his hand, Mr. Daniels stated he had fired a handgun the
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evening before. (See Tr., p.270, Ls.1-22.) Per the detective, Mr. Daniels later admitted that
story was false. (See Tr., p.270, L.23 - p.272, L.6.)
Detective O'Gorman testified that Mr. Daniels told him he was at a friend's house at the
time of the incident. (See Tr., p.272, Ls.7-15.) Mr. Daniels stated he had not been involved in
an altercation, and did not have a gun in his possession. (See Tr., p.272, L.24 - p.273, L.14.)
The detective went back to Ms. Hernandez's interview room, before he returned to Mr. Daniels
and stated that he knew Mr. Daniels had been involved in a shooting. (See Tr., p.273, L.15 p.274, L.4.) Detective O'Gorman testified that Ms. Hernandez's account of what had happened
had changed, and she had made statements contrary to the statements Mr. Daniels had made.
(See Tr., p.273, Ls.21-23, p.294, Ls.12-20.) Detective O'Gorman testified that Mr. Daniels then

changed his story, stating he had a handgun and had been involved in a shooting.

(See

Tr., p.274, Ls.4-17.) Mr. Daniels testified that he did not tell Detective O'Gorman up front what
had happened in the house, because he was scared. (See Tr., p.427, Ls.3-13.)
According to Detective O'Gorman, Mr. Daniels stated he went to the house with the gun
to help Jeff Mangum retrieve some money, but he tried to leave before entering the house when
he realized the house was Mr. Anderson's. (See Tr., p.274, L.18 - p.275, L.22.) Mr. Daniels
stated that, inside the house, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Anderson's cousin struck him.

(See

Tr., p.277, L.17 - p.278, L.3.) However, Detective O'Gorman testified he did not see any marks
on Mr. Daniels consistent with being hit, and Mr. Daniels pointed out during the interview that
he had no marks. (See Tr., p.278, Ls.6-14.) Mr. Daniels stated he removed the pistol from his
rear pocket, and it went off when he was hit. (See Tr., p.279, Ls.17-20.) The detective testified
that, for much of the interview, he repeatedly offered Mr. Daniels paths to self-defense, but
Mr. Daniels did not take them. (See Tr., p.288, Ls.8-12.)
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Ms. Hernandez testified that she and Mr. Mangum went into Mr. Anderson's house
before Mr. Daniels, and Mr. Anderson was upset because Mr. Mangum brought people into the
house.

(See Tr., p.361, L.1 - p.362, L.16.)

She testified that Mr. Anderson got mad at

Mr. Daniels when he entered the house, but Mr. Daniels remained calm. (See Tr., p.363, Ls.512.) She also saw a big knife or machete on a coffee table. (See Tr., p.366, L.21, p.367, L.7.)
However, Detective O'Gorman testified that Ms. Hernandez did not mention a machete in her
police interview. (See Tr., p.330, L.16-p.331, L.13.) A crime scene investigator for the Garden
City Police testified that she recalled seeing a machete type knife or sword in the house while
assisting with a search warrant following the incident.

(See Tr., p.234, L.7 - p.235, L.11.)

Detective O'Gorman testified that he saw a blade that looked more like a sword than a knife in
the house. (See Tr., p.316, L.16 - p.317, L.6.)
Ms. Hernandez testified that Mr. Anderson and another man hit Mr. Daniels.

(See

Tr., p.363, L.16 - p.264, L.6.) However, Detective O'Gorman testified that Ms. Hernandez, in
her police interview, described one person attacking Mr. Daniels. (See Tr., p.495, Ls.2-12.)
Ms. Hernandez testified she heard one or two shots, but did not see who had the gun or if there
was a gun at all. (See Tr., p.368, L.18 - p.369, L.6.) Alisha Clark, who had been in the house
before Mr. Daniels arrived, testified that she turned away from the fighting, heard a loud shot,
and then heard Mr. Anderson say he had been shot. (See Tr., pp.168, L.12-p.169, L.9.)
The State charged Mr. Daniels by Information with felony aggravated battery with a use
of a firearm or deadly weapon during the commission of a crime sentencing enhancement.
(R., pp.26-27, 33-34.) The State later charged Mr. Daniels with a persistent violator sentencing
enhancement. (R., pp.43-44.) Mr. Daniels pleaded not guilty, and exercised his right to a jury
trial. (See R., pp.31-32, 45, 69-85.) Mr. Anderson did not testify at the trial. (See generally Tr.)
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During cross-examination, Detective O'Gorman testified that Mr. Daniels in his
interview characterized Mr. Anderson "to be a member of something." (See Tr., p.313, Ls.1922.) Defense counsel and Detective O'Gorman then had the following exchange:
Q.

And what was that?

A.

He classified him as being a member of the SVC, Which is a gang.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Daniels also identified himself as an Aryan Knight dropout.

Q.

Okay. So are you familiar with those two gangs and the animosity
between the two?

A.

Yes, sir.

(Tr., p.313, L.23 - p.314, L.9.) Detective O'Gorman then testified that the prior incident was
from Mr. Anderson claiming Mr. Daniels had stolen from SVC. (See Tr., p.314, L.20 - p.316,
L. 15.)

During redirect examination, Detective O 'Gorman clarified that Mr. Daniels was

referring to himself as an Aryan Knight dropout. (Tr., p.331, Ls.14-22.)
After the detective finished his testimony, defense counsel noted that two current or
former IDOC employees had been seated on the jury panel. (See Tr., p.336, Ls.4-15.)
Mr. Daniels' counsel asserted that, when he asked Detective O'Gorman about the SVC gang,
"the witness also volunteered that Mr. Daniels relayed to him that he was an Aryan Knight
dropout." (Tr., p.336, Ls.17-21.) Defense counsel asserted: "Both of these gangs are prison
gangs.

They're well known in the prison.

And so now that this has come to light about

Mr. Daniels, these two jurors know that he's either been to prison or is in prison. And because of
that, I'm moving for a mistrial." (Tr., p.336, L.23 - p.337, L.2.)
In requesting a mistrial, defense counsel referred to the current or former IDOC
employees or "two jurors," Jurors 3 and 10. During voir dire, Juror 3 stated he had formerly
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worked for IDOC for ten and one-half years, as a food service officer, correctional corporal, and
finally a correctional shift commander, investigator. (See Tr., p.32, Ls.5-18, p.91, L.19 - p.92,
L.8.) As an investigator, Juror 3 had conducted fact findings and looked into rule violations.
(See Tr., p.92, Ls.12-16.) Juror 3 described his duties as, "Anything as simple as just a basic,

you know, finger pointing to something that could go as far as conducting a criminal
investigation for a felony." (Tr., p.92, Ls.16-18.) Juror 10 was currently an IDOC computer lab
instructor, who maintained an inmate network for student learning. (See Tr., pp.33, Ls.9-22,
p.92, Ls.19-24.) Juror 10 was not involved in disciplinary investigations, but could "write out
disciplinary reports if they commit some sort of offense in the classroom." (Tr., p.92, L.25 p.93, L.5.) Jurors 3 and 10 both sat on the jury panel. (Tr., p.133, Ls.14-22.)
The State responded to Mr. Daniels' request for a mistrial by arguing that it did not
intend to mention the Aryan Knights again, and the defense had elicited the testimony during
cross-examination. (See Tr., p.337, Ls.4-15.) The State also argued, "And I think it was elicited
fairly given the context of the question and it was within the ambit of the answer that was sought
by defense counsel regarding animosity between gangs, a prior theft of SVC's property or drugs
or something else." (Tr., p.337, Ls.15-21.)
Mr. Daniels' counsel replied, "I did not ask specifically what Mr. Daniels associated
himself with or had been associated with." (Tr., p.338, Ls.4-6.) Defense counsel admitted that
asking a follow-up question, "may have been error on my part."

(See Tr., p.338, Ls.7-8.)

However, defense counsel asserted, "there's now an issue that Mr. Daniels has a claim now this
jury is prejudiced and they cannot be fair in determining his guilt or innocence because of the
knowledge of these gangs in prison."

(Tr., p.338, Ls.10-14.)
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The State contended that

mentioning that Mr. Daniels was formerly in a prison gang did not rise to the level of prejudice
required for a mistrial. (See Tr., p.338, L.18 -p.339, L.1.)
The district court thought "it would have been fair to maybe further voir dire those
prospective jurors that have experience with the Department of Correction and explore what their
duties and obligations were and whether or not they are familiar with any gang activity that goes
on in the prison," but that inquiry did not happen. (See Tr., p.339, L.24- p.340, L.12.) The court
characterized Mr. Daniels' concern as being that the current or former IDOC employees would
tell the other jurors Mr. Daniels had been in a prison gang and therefore in prison.

(See

Tr., p.340, Ls.13-21.) Because it did not know if the !DOC-related jurors would do so, the
district court determined, "So at this point, I can't make a finding that there's been an error or
legal defect in the proceedings." (Tr., p.340, Ls.22-25.) Finding such an error, according to the
court, would require that the jurors ignore the previously-given jury instruction "which
specifically says to the jury that they are not to communicate any private or special knowledge
about any of the facts of this case to your fellow jurors." (Tr., p.341, Ls.1-6; see Tr., p.14 7,
Ls.17-19.)
The district court determined, "We haven't had a defect or a problem in the legal
proceedings at this point, so the Court's going to deny the motion." (Tr., p.341, Ls.12-14.) The
court also determined: "And I guess the final grounds for denying the motion at this point is the
subject of a gang conflict was brought up by the defense. And I don't know that I can declare a
mistrial and essentially hold things against the State for something the defense brought up."
(Tr., p.341, L.23 - p.342, L.2.)
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Mr. Daniels testified that, while driving with Ms. Hernandez the morning of the incident,
he made arrangements to meet Jeff Mangum at a gas station. (See Tr., p.398, L.3 - p.40, L.14.) 1
Mr. Mangum asked Mr. Daniels for a ride home to Nampa, but the three ended up at a trailer
park on 44th Street. (See Tr., p.404, L.20 - p.405, L.10.) Mr. Mangum stated he needed to stop
by his friend's house, but at the trailer park, he revealed the house was Mr. Anderson's. (See
Tr., p.405, Ls.10-24.)
Mr. Daniels testified that he knew Mr. Anderson from a previous incident involving
Mr. Daniels' girlfriend. (See Tr., p.406, L.3 - p.408, L.8.) Mr. Daniels and his girlfriend, Hailey
Mangum, testified that while she was babysitting for a friend and Mr. Daniels was out at a gas
station, Mr. Anderson showed up with brass knuckles and threatened her. (See Tr., p.388, L.13 p.391, L.15, p.406, L.12 - p.4.) According to Mr. Daniels, one of Mr. Anderson's friends had
accused Mr. Daniels of theft. (See Tr., p.408, L.17 - p.409, L.19.) Ms. Mangum testified that
she was scared because she knew Mr. Anderson was part of the Severely Violent Criminals
(SVC) gang. (See Tr., p.393, Ls.5-9.) She testified that Mr. Anderson told her he was in SVC,
and he threatened her and her family. (See Tr., p.393, Ls.10-16.) Mr. Daniels similarly testified
that, after he returned, Mr. Anderson stated he was in SVC and threatened to beat him and kill
him and his family. (See Tr., p.407, Ls.11-18.) He testified that Derek Tuschoffwas also there
with Mr. Anderson. (See Tr., p.406, L.19 - p.407, L.2.) The verbal altercation ended when
Ms. Mangum's friend showed up. (See Tr., pp.393-94, p.408, Ls.1-8.)
That prior incident was going through Mr. Daniels' head while he was outside
Mr. Anderson's house, and he testified that he told Mr. Mangum about that bad blood. (See
Tr., p.410, Ls.4-6, p.411, Ls.2-4.)

Mr. Mangum stated he had already spoken with

1

All citations to "Tr." refer to the Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial, conducted on August 2628, 2019.
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Mr. Anderson, who knew he was in the wrong. (See Tr., p.411, Ls.5-10.) Mr. Mangum wanted
to clear the air and make things right, and Mr. Daniels said he could go in for a couple minutes.
(See Tr., p.411, L.12 - p.412, L.3.) He testified that he had a gun in his back pocket, but he did

not know the gun was loaded. (See Tr., p.414, L.9 - p.415, L.14.) The gun belonged to his
employer, who had left it in Mr. Daniels' truck the night before. (See Tr., p.412, L.17 - p.414,
L.8.)
Mr. Daniels testified that Mr. Anderson and Mr. Mangum were talking when he entered,
and Mr. Anderson began yelling at him and asking what he was doing in the house.
Tr., p.415, Ls.15-22.)

(See

Mr. Anderson and Mr. Tuschoff, also in the house, immediately

recognized Mr. Daniels. (See Tr., p.415, L.23 - p.416, L.1.) Mr. Daniels said that Mr. Mangum
told him Mr. Anderson wanted to talk with him, but Mr. Anderson ranted that he was in SVC
and he would paralyze Mr. Daniels for life. (See Tr., p.416, L.20 - p.417, L.5.) Mr. Daniels saw
a machete-like knife in the room. (See Tr., p.418, Ls.2-23.)
Per Mr. Daniels, he stated he was going to leave, but Mr. Tuschoff cornered him. (See
Tr., p.417, Ls.9-21.) Mr. Anderson then came towards him and started swinging with his fists.
(See Tr., p.420, Ls.4-22.) He tried to fend off Mr. Anderson, but Mr. Tuschoff struck him on the

left side of his head and knocked him back against a wall. (See Tr., p.420, L.18 - p.421, L.8.)
As both of them came at Mr. Daniels, he heard the sound of a knife being dragged on a surface.
(See Tr., p.421, Ls.9-15.)

Mr. Daniels testified that he got scared and went for the gun in his back pocket.
(Tr., p.422, Ls.1-4.) He testified that he intended to use the gun to scare them to get away from
him, so he and Ms. Hernandez could get out of the house. (See Tr., p.422, Ls.5-13.) When he
got the gun out, Mr. Tuschoff continued to hit him. (Tr., p.422, Ls.14-16.) Mr. Daniels testified
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that he fell back during one of those hits and hit the wall, and the gun went off (Tr., p.422,
Ls.16-18.) Mr. Daniels testified that he did not intend for the gun to go off, and he could not say
that he intentionally stuck his finger in the trigger guard. (See Tr., p.422, L.19 - p.423, L.4.)
When the gun went off, he was not pointing it at anyone. (Tr., p.423, Ls.5-7.) However, he later
told Ms. Hernandez in a jail phone call that he intended to shoot a round in the floor. (See
Tr., p.423, Ls.8-15.)
Mr. Daniels testified that, after the gun went off, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Tuschoff
scattered away from him, and he and Ms. Hernandez left the house. (See Tr., p.423, L.21 p.425, L.3.) He jumped into his truck, and the gun was placed in the passenger door panel. (See
Tr., p.425, Ls.4-12.) He testified that he may have handed the gun to Ms. Hernandez to do that,
but he was not sure if she actually took it or not. (See Tr., p.425, Ls.13-18.)
The jury found Mr. Daniels guilty of aggravated battery with the use of a firearm or a
deadly weapon in the commission of a crime, and Mr. Daniels admitted to the prior offenses
underlying the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.88-99, 120.) The district
court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed. (R., pp.123-26.)
Mr. Daniels filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of
Conviction. (R., pp.130-33.)

10

ISSUE
Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied Mr. Daniels' motion for a mistrial?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Denied Mr. Daniels' Motion For
A Mistrial
A.

Introduction
Mr. Daniels asserts the district court committed reversible error when it denied his

motion for a mistrial.

Contrary to the district court's determination, Detective O'Gorman's

volunteered statement that Mr. Daniels identified himself as a former member of the Aryan
Knights was not invited error, because the statement was nonresponsive to defense counsel's
question on Mr. Anderson's affiliations.

When viewed in the context of the full record,

Detective O'Gorman's statement constituted reversible error, despite the district court previously
instructing the jurors not to share private or special knowledge with each other. It was extremely
prejudicial to have the two jurors currently or formerly employed by IDOC learn that
Mr. Daniels was a former prison gang member.

B.

Standard Of Review
"A mistrial may be declared on motion of the defendant when there occurs during the

trial, either inside or outside the courtroom, an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or
conduct that is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial."
I.C.R. 29. l(a).
As the Idaho Supreme Court has held, "In reviewing a district court's denial of a motion
for mistrial in a criminal case, the question is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made." State v.
Johnson, 163 Idaho 412, 421 (2018) (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912

(2003).

"Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for

12

mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record." Id. "Thus,
where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the 'abuse of discretion' standard
is a misnomer." Id. "The standard, more accurately stated, is one ofreversible error." Id. The
appellate court's "focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered
the mistrial motion." Id. "The trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if
that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error." Id.

C.

Detective O'Gorman's Volunteered Statement Was Not Invited Error, Because The
Statement Was N onresponsive
Contrary to the district court's determination, Detective O'Gorman's volunteered

statement that Mr. Daniels identified himself as a former member of the Aryan Knights was not
invited error, because the statement was nonresponsive to defense counsel's question on
Mr. Anderson's affiliations. "The invited error doctrine precludes a criminal defendant from
'consciously' inviting district court action and then successfully claiming those actions are
erroneous on appeal." State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 420 (2015) (quoting State v. Owsley,
105 Idaho 836, 837 (1983)). "It has long been the law in Idaho that one may not successfully
complain of errors one has acquiesced in or invited. Errors consented, acquiesced in, or invited
are not reversible." Id. at 420-21. "The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party
who caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court to take action, from later
challenging that decision on appeal." State v. Barr, No. 46094, 2020 WL 2488829, at *3 (Idaho
May 14, 2020) (citing State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237,240 (1999)).
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1.

A N onresponsive Answer Given During Defense Cross-Examination Of A
Witness Is Not Invited Error

Whether an answer given during defense cross-examination of a witness is invited error
depends on whether the answer is responsive to defense counsel's question.

A volunteered

statement that is not a response to any inquiry put to the witness is not invited error. See State v.
Simonson, 112 Idaho 451 (Ct. App. 1987). In Simonson, a felony injury to child case, the

defendant initially pleaded guilty, but later withdrew his plea and went to trial. See id. at 452.
The mother of the alleged victim testified for the State, and described her relationship with the
defendant and the incident underlying the charge. See id. at 452-53. On cross-examination, the
defendant's counsel "pursued a line of inquiry showing that the she had continued to have
contact, and to have maintained their relationship, with Simonson after the incident .... " Id. at
453. Defense counsel then questioned the mother as follows:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you have had the kids with him since then?
[WITNESS]: The kids live with me. When Larry comes over, the children are
there.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You have gone places, I think you said, didn't you?
[WITNESS]: Initially we did, before he pleaded guilty we went places. After he
pleaded guilty and changed his pleaId. The defendant's counsel then filed a motion for a mistral, and the district court denied the

motion but gave the jury a cautionary instruction. Id. The jury ultimately found the defendant
guilty, and the district court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis of
prejudice from the mother's reference to the guilty plea. See id.
On appeal, the Simonson defendant argued that the district court "erred in refusing to
grant either the motion for a mistrial or the motion for a new trial, predicated on the reference to
his guilty plea." Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals acknowledged that evidence of a guilty plea
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which was later withdrawn, is generally inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 410. See id.
at 454. The Simonson Court next held: "Here, in all fairness to the state, we recognize that the
reference to Simonson's guilty plea was not adduced by the prosecution as part of its case in
chief to prove Simonson's guilt. Neither was it a likely response to any inquiry put to the
witness by defense counsel, and thus did not amount to invited error." Id. The Court instead
held that "the statement was simply volunteered by the witness in explaining certain events that,
apparently to her, were related in time." Id.
The Simonson Court, in light of the great weight of authority concluding that such
evidence is inadmissible, held that error occurred. Id. The Court observed, "Our decision is
supported in particular by cases where such evidence-received as volunteered, non-responsive
statements from a witness during trial-has been held to constitute error." Id. at 454-56 (citing
State v. Jensen, 279 P. 506 (Utah 1929); People v. Bain, 295 N.E.2d 295 (Ill. App. 1973);
People v. Haycraft, 221 N.E.2d 317 (Ill. App. 1966)). The Court also did "not believe the

cautionary instruction given by the court in this case could have removed the effect of the
prejudicial evidence from the minds of the jurors." Id. at 457. The Simonson Court held that the
error may have contributed to the verdict, and reversed the denial of the motion for a new trial.
See id. at 458.

Conversely, an answer responsive to defense counsel's cross-examination question is
deemed invited error. See Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 435 ("[S]ome of the allegedly inadmissible
statements identified by Abdullah in his brief were elicited by the defense on cross-examination.
Abdullah cannot complain of any error in out-of-court statements he elicited."); State v. Parker,
157 Idaho 132, 148 n.2 (2014) (noting that a detective's response to cross-examination was
invited error, where defense counsel asked if the defendant was being cooperative during an
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entire interview, and the detective replied that he was being cooperative, but lying about certain
things); State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 66 (1992) ("Appellant cannot now be heard to denounce
testimony that he roused.").
One example of an "accurate, fair and responsive answer to defense counsel's question"
is found in State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. App. 1993), rev. denied (Jan. 6, 1994). The
defendant in Atkinson was found guilty of aggravated battery for allegedly throwing the victim
off a train. See id. at 817. The defendant allegedly threw another person, Sam Thurman, off the
train later, killing that person, as was charged in a separate case. See id. at 817 & n.1. During
the trial, the victim testified about "the guy that died"; while defense counsel did not object, the
district court had the attorneys approach the bench to discuss the line of testimony concerning
Sam's death. See id. at 81 7. The district court also instructed a witness that testimony regarding
the deceased person being thrown off the train and his subsequent death would not be allow. See
id. at 817-18. However, during cross-examination, in response to a question by defense counsel,
the witness responded, "After he [Atkinson] threw Sam off."

See id. at 818 (alteration in

original). Defense counsel filed a motion for a mistrial, which the district court denied. Id.
On appeal, the defendant in Atkinson asserted error in the denial of the mistrial motion
following the statements of the victim and the witness regarding Sam's ejection from the train
and subsequent death.

See id.

The Court of Appeals held that the statements were not

admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). See id. at 818-19. However, the Atkinson
Court also held that the testimony "was invited, and therefore the mistrial was properly denied."
Id. at 819. The Court observed that the witness had previously indicated "that if he was going to
be asked about the altercation between himself and Atkinson, he would have to include Sam's
ejection from the train because it was part of the entire sequence of events." See id. at 819-20.
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The district court had also instructed the witness "that he was not to bring up the subject unless
specifically asked a question about the circumstances involved." Id. at 820.
The Atkinson Court stated, "Even during the exchange that brought out the challenged
testimony, it appears the witness was trying to avoid discussing Sam but was required to do so in
order to respond to inquiry by defense counsel." Id. Defense counsel had questioned the witness
on whether he had pushed the defendant in the chest after the defendant threw the victim off the
train. Id. The witness denied doing so, stating, "I didn't-at this time I did not do that." Id. at
821. Defense counsel asked, "Did you at any time?" and the witness replied, "Yes, sir." Id.
Defense counsel then asked, "When?" and the witness answered, "After he threw Sam off" Id.
According to the Atkinson Court, "The witness gave an accurate, fair and responsive
answer to defense counsel's question of 'When?"' Id. Defense counsel later "admitted on the
record that he did not know what the witness was going to answer in response to that question,"
and the Court held, "Defense counsel's failure to know the answer to the question or his
misunderstanding of the sequence of events does not excuse the invited nature of the error." Id.
The Atkinson Court explained, "A misstep on dangerous ground, where counsel has voluntarily
ventured but is unsure of possible responses, may result in invited error, and if so, cannot then be
grounds for a mistrial." Id.
The defendant in Atkinson had cited Simonson "for the proposition that inadvertence
makes no difference in the prejudicial impact and therefore does not serve as a proper ground for
admission." Id. The Atkinson Court distinguished Simonson: "[I]n Simonson, the testimony did
come in under questioning by the defense, but the answer given was not responsive to the
question asked.

Defense counsel in Simonson asked a specific question expecting a certain

answer when the witness instead volunteered evidence of a prior guilty plea." Id. The Atkinson
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Court held: "This Court ruled in Simonson that the testimony was not, therefore, invited error.
In this case, the answer given was responsive, and, thus, the error was invited, distinguishing

Simonson." Id. Thus, the Atkinson Court held the district court properly denied the motion for
a mistrial. Id.

2.

Detective Gorman's Volunteered Statement Was Nonresponsive, And Therefore
Was Not Invited Error

Like the error in Simonson, and contrary to the district court's determination, the error
here was not invited because Detective Gorman's volunteered statement was nonresponsive.
The exchange during the cross-examination of Detective Gorman was as follows:
Q. Okay. There was some discussion in your-well, you wrote down in your
police report about what John characterized Chris to be a member of something?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are you familiar with what he was talking about?
A. Yes, sir.
Q And what was that?
A. He classified him as being a member of the SVC, Which is a gang.
Q. Okay.
A. Daniels also identified himself as an Aryan Knight dropout.

Q. Okay. So are you familiar with those two gangs and the animosity between the
two?
A. Yes, sir.
(Tr., p.313, L.19 -p.314, L.9.) During redirect examination, Detective O'Gorman clarified that
Mr. Daniels was referring to himself as an Aryan Knight dropout. (Tr., p.331, Ls.14-22.)
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As a preliminary matter, Detective O'Gorman's volunteered statement is inadmissible
pnor acts evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), much like the evidence of the
defendant in Atkinson throwing Sam off the train. See I.R.E. 404(b ). As the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit put it, "While evidence of gang membership is admissible if
relevant to a disputed issue, gang affiliation evidence is not admissible where it is meant merely
to prejudice the defendant or prove his guilt by association with unsavory characters." United
States v. McKay, 431 F.3d 1085, 1092 (2005) (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks

omitted). Here, the State did not articulate a non-propensity purpose for admitting the statement
that Mr. Daniels identified himself as a former Aryan Knights member. (See Tr., p.337, Ls.1224.) Moreover, the State had not provided the requisite Rule 404(b) notice of intent to present
such prior acts evidence. See I.R.E. 404(b). Thus, Detective O'Gorman's volunteered statement
was inadmissible.
Turning to whether Detective Gorman's volunteered statement was invited error, his
statement was not invited because it was not responsive to the question asked by Mr. Daniels'
counsel. Like in Simonson, defense counsel here "asked a specific question expecting a certain
answer .... " See Atkinson, 124 Idaho at 821. Mr. Daniels' counsel asked Detective O'Gorman,
"you wrote down in your police report about what John characterized Chris to be a member of
something?" followed by, "Are you familiar with what he was talking about?" and, "And what
was that?" (Tr., p.313, L.19 - p.314, L.1.) This line of questioning from defense counsel was
not open-ended, nor did it call for the objectionable answer.

Mr. Daniels' counsel told the

district court: "I did not ask specifically what Mr. Daniels associated himself with or had been
associated with." (Tr., p.338, Ls.4-6.)
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Detective O'Gorman answered that Mr. Daniels classified Mr. Anderson "as being a
member of the SVC, which is a gang," but followed that answer with the volunteered statement,
"Daniels also identified himself as an Aryan Knight dropout."

(Tr., p.314, Ls.2-6.)

The

volunteered statement on Mr. Daniels' identification was nonresponsive to this line of
questioning, which called for an answer on Mr. Anderson's affiliations. (See Tr., p.313, L.19 p.314, L.1.)

Thus, like the volunteered, nonresponsive answer in Simonson, Detective

O'Gorman's volunteered statement was nonresponsive. See Simonson, 112 Idaho at 454.
Because Detective O'Gorman's volunteered statement that Mr. Daniels identified himself
as a former Aryan Knights member was not responsive to the question asked by defense counsel,
his statement was not invited error. See Atkinson, 124 Idaho at 821; Simonson, 112 Idaho at 454.
The district court therefore erred when it denied Mr. Daniels' motion for a mistrial on that basis.

D.

Detective O'Gorman's Volunteered Statement Constituted Reversible Error
When viewed in the context of the full record, Detective O'Gorman's volunteered

statement constituted reversible error, despite the district court previously instructing the jury not
to share special knowledge with each other. As seen above, the question here is "whether the
event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the
context of the full record." Johnson, 163 Idaho at 421. The reviewing court's "focus is upon the
continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion." Id. "The trial
judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively,
constituted reversible error." Id.
The Johnson Court also held, "The admission of improper evidence does not
automatically require the declaration of a mistral." Id. at 422 (quoting State v. Hill, 140 Idaho
625, 631 (Ct. App. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "Error in admission
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of evidence may be cured by proper instruction, and it must be presumed that the jury obeyed the
trial court's direction." Id. (quoting State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 905-06 n.6 (1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In Johnson, a lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen case, the defendant moved
for a mistrial after a detective, on direct examination by the State, responded to a question on
who he had interviewed in his investigation by stating he had tried to interview the defendant.
See id. at 416, 421. The district court sustained the defendant's objection and struck the answer

as an impermissible comment on the defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent. See id.
at 421. However, the district court deferred ruling on the motion for a mistrial, and instead
proceeded with the trial after giving a curative instruction to the jury. See id. The district court
later denied the motion for a mistrial. Id.
On appeal, the Johnson Court held the district court correctly sustained the objection and
struck the detective's answer as an impermissible comment on the defendant's right to remain
silent. Id. at 422. The Court then wrote, "Due to the district court's curative instruction, we hold
the district court did not err in denying the motion for mistrial." Id. The Court observed that the
entirety of the stricken comment was that the detective tried to interview the defendant, and the
prosecution did not encourage or invite the jury to draw any inferences therefrom. Id.
After the detective in Johnson made the impermissible comment, "the court granted a
curative instruction which informed the jury: 1) of the right to silence; 2) that a defendant was
entitled to invoke that right; 3) it was to disregard the detective's comment; and 4) to draw no
further inferences from the stricken comment." Id. The Johnson Court held," There is no reason
in the record to believe that the jury ignored this instruction and drew impermissible inferences
of guilt from the stricken comment." Id.

Thus, the Court presumed the jury followed the
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curative instruction in its entirety, and held the events that precipitated the motion for a mistrial
did not represent a reversible error. Id.
In contrast to the impermissible comment in Johnson, when viewed in the context of the
full record, Detective O'Gorman's statement constituted reversible error, despite the district
court previously instructing the jurors not to share private or special knowledge with each other.
This is because of the extremely prejudicial effect of the statement, which injected propensity or
character evidence into the trial. (See Tr., p.336, L.17 - p.337, L.2, p.338, Ls.10-14.) The Idaho
Supreme Court has noted, "Rules of Evidence such as 404 ... recognize implicitly that previous
bad acts ... are prejudicial." State v. Bingham, 124 Idaho 698, 701 (1993). "The prejudicial
effect of [character] evidence is that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to
have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character." State v. Grist, 147
Idaho 49, 52 (2008) (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 (1978)) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (alteration in original). "Character evidence, therefore, takes the jury away from
their primary consideration of the guilt or innocence of the particular crime on trial." Id. (citing
Wrenn, 99 Idaho at 510).

Prior acts evidence of gang affiliation is particularly prejudicial. The Eighth Circuit has
observed, "To be certain, there is great potential for prejudice when evidence regarding gangs is
at issue." United States v. Bradford, 246 F.3d 1107, 1117 (8 th Cir. 2001). The Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed a trial court's ruling that gang evidence was inadmissible, where the trial court
reasoned "that it was not willing to insert the extremely prejudicial issue of gang membership
into the case since the evidence did not clearly establish that the incident was gang related."
Redding v. State, 733 S.E.2d 383,387 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
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Here, through Detective O'Gorman's voluntary statement, the two jurors currently or
formerly employed by IDOC learned that Mr. Daniels was a former prison gang member.
Defense counsel asserted that the Aryan Knights was a prison gang that was well known in the
prison. (See Tr., p.336, Ls.23-24.) Thus, it was likely that the jurors currently or formerly
employed by IDOC knew of the nature of the Aryan Knights, as well as the implications of
Mr. Daniels identifying himself as an Aryan Knight dropout. That is especially the case with
respect to Juror 3, who had been a correctional shift commander, investigator, and who looked
into rule violations as serious as those involved in felony criminal investigations. (See Tr., p.92,
Ls.12-18.)
The district court determined it did not know if the jurors currently or formerly employed
by IDOC would tell the other jurors that Mr. Daniels had been a prison gang and in prison. (See
Tr., p.340, Ls.22-23.) Per the court, that would require the jurors to ignore the previously-given
jury instruction that they were not to share any private or special knowledge about the facts of
the case. (Tr., p.341, Ls.1-7.) The district court had instructed the jurors, "Do not communicate
any private or special knowledge about any of the facts of this case to your fellow jurors."
(R., p.103; Tr., p.147, Ls.17-19.)
However, Mr. Daniels' counsel expressed specific concerns about the two !DOC-related
jurors: "And so now it has come to light about Mr. Daniels, these two jurors know that he's
either been to prison or is in prison."

(Tr., p.337.)

The district court had also instructed

the jurors:
You bring with you to this courtroom all the experience and background of your
lives. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe,
what you believe, and how much weight to attach to what you were told. The
same considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in making these
decisions are the considerations which you should apply in your deliberations.
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(R., p.98; Tr., p.143, Ls.7-14.) The above language matches language in the pattern criminal
jury instructions. See ICJI 104. The Idaho Supreme Court has held: "we also 'expect jurors to
bring with them to jury service their background, knowledge and experience.' Miller v. Hailer,
[129 Idaho 345, 350] (1996); see also ICJI 104. Such information is not considered extraneous
information. Miller, 129 Idaho at 350. Indeed, we encourage jurors to use their life experiences
when evaluating testimony. ICJI 104." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 566 (2008).
Because jurors are presumed to follow jury instructions, if the two jurors currently or
formerly employed by IDOC followed the jury instruction to not communicate any private or
special knowledge to the jurors, they would have also followed the instruction to use their life
experiences when evaluating testimony. See Johnson, 163 Idaho at 421. Thus, it is likely that
the two jurors currently or formerly employed by IDOC considered Detective O'Gorman's
volunteered statement that Mr. Daniels identified himself as a former Aryan Knights member,
meaning Mr. Daniels had been in a prison gang and in prison, while weighing the case.
The full record in this case also includes the overall weakness of the evidence supporting
the State's theory that Mr. Daniels intentionally shot Mr. Anderson. Mr. Daniels testified that he
did not intend for the gun to go off (See Tr., p.422, Ls.19-21.) He also testified that, when the
gun went off, he was not pointing it at anyone. (See Tr., p.423, Ls.5-7.) No witness testified to
seeing Mr. Daniels aim the gun at Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson did not testify. (See generally
Tr.) Ms. Hernandez and Ms. Clark, the witnesses in the house at the time of the shooting,
testified they did not see the shot. (See Tr., pp.169, Ls.4-9, p.368, L.18- p.369, L.6.)
Thus, when viewed in the context of the full record, Detective O'Gorman's volunteered
statement constituted reversible error.

See Johnson, 163 Idaho at 421.

The district court

committed reversible error when it denied Mr. Daniels' motion for a mistrial. This Court should
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therefore vacate the district court's order denying the motion for a mistrial and Mr. Daniels'
judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Daniels respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court's denial of his motion for a mistrial and his judgment of conviction, and remand this
matter for further proceedings.
DATED this 9th day of October, 2020.
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